Learning from Apple’s #gotofail Security Bug

Yesterday, Apple announced iOS7.0.6, a critical security update for iOS7 — and an update for OSX / Safari is likely to follow soon (if you haven’t updated iOS yet, do it now).

The problem turns out to be caused by a seemingly simple programming error, now widely discussed as #gotofail on Twitter.

What can we, as software engineers and educators of software engineers, learn from this high impact bug?

The Code

A careful analysis of the underlying problem is provided by Adam Langley. The root cause is in the following code:

static OSStatus
SSLVerifySignedServerKeyExchange(SSLContext *ctx, bool isRsa, SSLBuffer signedParams,
                                 uint8_t *signature, UInt16 signatureLen)
{
    OSStatus        err;
    ...

    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &serverRandom)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
        goto fail;
        goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    ...

fail:
    SSLFreeBuffer(&signedHashes);
    SSLFreeBuffer(&hashCtx);
    return err;
}

To any software engineer, the two consecutive goto fail lines will be suspicious. They are, and more than that. To quote Adam Langley:

The code will always jump to the end from that second goto, err will contain a successful value because the SHA1 update operation was successful and so the signature verification will never fail.

Not verifying a signature is exploitable. In the upcoming months, there will remain plenty of devices running older versions of iOS and MacOS. These will remain vulnerable, and epxloitable.

Brittle Software Engineering

When first seeing this code, I was once again caught by how incredibly brittle programming is. Just adding a single line of code can bring a system to its knees.

For seasoned software engineers this will not be a real surprise. But students and aspiring software engineers will have a hard time believing it. Therefore, sharing problems like this is essential, in order to create sufficient awareness among students that code quality matters.

Code Formatting is a Security Feature

When reviewing code, I try to be picky on details, including white spaces, tabs, and new lines. Not everyone likes me for that. I often wondered whether I was just annoyingly pedantic, or whether it was the right thing to do.

The case at hand shows that white space is a security concern. The correct indentation immediately shows something fishy is going on, as the final check now has become unreachable:

    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0)
        goto fail;
    goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
        goto fail;

Insisting on curly braces would hightlight the fault even more:

    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.update(&hashCtx, &signedParams)) != 0) {
        goto fail;
    }
    goto fail;
    if ((err = SSLHashSHA1.final(&hashCtx, &hashOut)) != 0)
        goto fail;

Indentation Must be Automatic

Because code formatting is a security feature, we must not do it by hand, but use tools to get the indentation right automatically.

A quick inspection of the sslKeyExchange.c source code reveals that it is not routinely formatted automatically: There are plenty of inconsistent spaces, tabs, and code in comments. With modern tools, such as Eclipse-format-on-save, one would not be able to save code like this.

Yet just forcing developers to use formating tools may not be enough. We must also invest in improving the quality of such tools. In some cases, hand-made layout can make a substantial difference in understandability of code. Perhaps current tools do not sufficiently acknowledge such needs, leading to under-use of today’s formatting tools.

Code Review to the Rescue?

Besides automated code formatting, critical reviews might also help. In the words of Adam Langley:

Code review can be effective against these sorts of bug. Not just auditing, but review of each change as it goes in. I’ve no idea what the code review culture is like at Apple but I strongly believe that my colleagues, Wan-Teh or Ryan Sleevi, would have caught it had I slipped up like this. Although not everyone can be blessed with folks like them.

While I fully subscribe to the importance of reviews, a word of caution is at place. My colleague Alberto Bacchelli has investigated how code review is applied today at Microsoft. His findings (published as a paper at ICSE 2013, and nicely summarized by Alex Nederlof as The Truth About Code Reviews) include:

There is a mismatch between the expectations and the actual outcomes of code reviews. From our study, review does not result in identifying defects as often as project members would like and even more rarely detects deep, subtle, or “macro” level issues. Relying on code review in this way for quality assurance may be fraught.

Automated Checkers to the Rescue?

If manual reviews won’t find the problem, perhaps tools can find it? Indeed, the present mistake is a simple example of a problem caused by unreachable code. Any computer science student will be able to write a (basic) “unreachable code detector” that would warn about the unguarded goto fail followed by more (unreachable) code (assuming parsing C is a ‘solved problem’).

Therefore, it is no surprise that plenty of commercial and open source tools exist to check for such problems automatically: Even using the compiler with the right options (presumably -Weverything for Clang) would warn about this problem.

Here, again, the key question is why such tools are not applied. The big problem with tools like these is their lack of precision, leading to too many false alarms. Forcing developers to wade through long lists of irrelevant warnings will do little to prevent bugs like these.

Unfortunately, this lack of precision is a direct consequence of the fact that unreachable code detection (like many other program properties of interest) is a fundamentally undecidable problem. As such, an analysis always needs to make a tradeoff between completeness (covering all suspicious cases) and precision (covering only cases that are certainly incorrect).

To understand the sweet spot in this trade off, more research is needed, both concerning the types of errors that are likely to occur, and concerning techniques to discover them automatically.

Testing is a Security Concern

As an advocate of unit testing, I wonder how the code could have passed a unit test suite.

Unfortunately, the testability of the problematic source code is very poor. In the current code, functions are long, and they cover many cases in different conditional branches. This makes it hard to invoke specific behavior, and bring the functions in a state in which the given behavior can be tested. Furthermore, observability is low, especially since parts of the code deliberately obfuscate results to protect against certain times of attacks.

Thus, given the current code structure, unit testing will be difficult. Nevertheless, the full outcome can be tested, albeit it at the system (not unit) level. Quoting Adam Langley again:

I coded up a very quick test site at https://www.imperialviolet.org:1266. […] If you can load an HTTPS site on port 1266 then you have this bug.

In other words, while the code may be hard to unit test, the system luckily has well defined behavior that can be tested.

Coverage Analysis

Once there is a set of (system or unit level) tests, the coverage of these tests can be used an indicator for (the lack of) completeness of the test suite.

For the bug at hand, even the simplest form of coverage analysis, namely line coverage, would have helped to spot the problem: Since the problematic code results from unreachable code, there is no way to achieve 100% line coverage.

Therefore, any serious attempt to achieve full statement coverage should have revealed this bug.

Note that trying to achieve full statement coverage, especially for security or safety critical code, is not a strange thing to require. For aviation software, statement coverage is required for criticality “level C”:

Level C:

Software whose anomalous behavior, as shown by the system safety assessment process, would cause or contribute to a failure of system function resulting in a major failure condition for the aircraft.

This is one of the weaker categories: For the catastrophic ‘level A’, even stronger test coverage criteria are required. Thus, achieving substantial line coverage is neither impossible nor uncommon.

The Return-Error-Code Idiom

Finally, looking at the full sources of the affected file, one of the key things to notice is the use of the return code idiom to mimic exception handling.

Since C has no built-in exception handling support, a common idiom is to insist that every function returns an error code. Subsequently, every caller must check this returned code, and include an explicit jump to the error handling functionality if the result is not OK.

This is exactly what is done in the present code: The global err variable is set, checked, and returned for every function call, and if not OK followed by (hopefully exactly one) goto fail.

Almost 10 years ago, together with Magiel Bruntink and Tom Tourwe, we conducted a detailed empirical analysis of this idiom in a large code base of an embedded system.

One of the key findings of our paper is that in the code we analyzed we found a defect density of 2.1 deviations from the return code idiom per 1000 lines of code. Thus, in spite of very strict guidelines at the organization involved, we found many examples of not just unchecked calls, but also incorrectly propagated return codes, or incorrectly handled error conditions.

Based on that, we concluded:

The idiom is particularly error prone, due to the fact that it is omnipresent as well as highly tangled, and requires focused and well-thought programming.

It is sad to see our results from 2005 confirmed today.


© Arie van Deursen, February 22, 2014.


EDIT February 24, 2014: Fixed incorrect use of ‘dead code detection’ terminology into correct ‘unreachable code detection’, and weakened the claim that any computer science student can write such a detector based on the reddit discussion.


Test Coverage: Not for Managers?

Last week I was discussing how one of my students could use test coverage analysis in his daily work. His observation was that his manager had little idea about coverage. Do managers need coverage information? Can they do harm with coverage numbers? What good can project leads do with coverage data?

For me, coverage analysis is first and foremost a code reviewing tool. Test coverage information helps me to see which code has not been tested. This I can use to rethink

  1. The test suite: How can I extend the test suite to cover the corner cases that I missed?
  2. The test strategy: Is there a need for me to extend my suite to cover the untested code? Why did I miss it?
  3. The system design: How can I refactor my code so that it becomes easier to test the missing cases?
  4. An incoming change (pull request): Is the contributed code well tested?

Coverage is not a management tool. While coverage information is essential to have good discussions on testing, using test coverage percentages to manage a project calls for caution.

To appreciate why managing by coverage numbers is problematic, let’s look at four common pitfalls of using software metrics in general, and see how they apply to test coverage as well.

Coverage Without Context

A coverage number gives a percentage of statements (or classes, methods, branches, blocks, …) in your program hit by the test suite. But what does such a number mean? Is 80% good or not? When is it good? Why is it good? Should I be alarmed at anything below 50%?

The key observation is that coverage numbers should not be leading: coverage targets (if used at all) should be derived from an overall project goal. For example:

  • We want a well-designed system. Therefore we use coverage analysis to discover classes that are too hard to test and hence call for refactoring;
  • We want to make sure we have meaningful tests in place for all critical behavior. Therefore, we analyze for which parts of this behavior no such tests are in place.
  • We have observed class Foo is bug prone. Hence we monitor its coverage, and no change that decreases its coverage is allowed.
  • For the avionics software system we are building, we need to comply with standard DO178b. Thus, we must demonstrate that we achieve modified condition/decision coverage;

With these higher level goals in place, it is also possible to argue when low coverage is acceptable:

  • These packages are deprecated, so we do not need to rethink the test suite nor its design anymore.
  • These classes take care of the user interface, which we do not consider critical for our application
  • These classes are so simple that we deem automated testing unnecessary.
  • This code has been stable for years, so we do not really care anymore how well it is tested.

Code coverage is a means to an end; it is not a goal in itself.

Treating The Numbers

The number one reason developers are wary of managers using coverage numbers is that it may give incentives to write useless tests.

Measuring Snow

src: flickr

Coverage numbers are easily tricked. All one needs to do is invoke a few methods in the test cases. No need for assertions, or any meaningful verification of the outcomes, and the coverage numbers are likely to go up.

Test cases to game coverage numbers are dangerous:

  1. The resulting test cases are extremely weak. The only information they provide is that a certain sequence of calls does not lead to an unexpected exception.

  2. The faked high coverage may give a false sense of confidence;

  3. The presence of poor tests undermines the testing culture in the team.

Once again: A code coverage percentage is not a goal in itself: It is a means to an end.

One-Track Coverage

There is little information that can be derived from the mere knowledge that a test suite covers 100% of the statements. Which data values went through the statements? Was my if-then conditional exercised with a true as well as a false value? What happens if I invoke my methods in a different order?

Marter track in snow

src: flickr

A lot more information can be derived from the fact that the test suite achieves, say, just 50% test coverage. This means that half of your code is not even touched by the test suite. The number tells you that you cannot use your test suite to say anything about the quality of half of your code base.

As such, statement coverage can tell us when a test suite is inadequate, but it can never tell us whether a test suite is adequate.

For this reason, a narrow focus on a single type of coverage (such as statement coverage) is undesirable. Instead, a team should be aware of a range of different coverage criteria, and use them where appropriate. Example criteria include decision coverage, state transition coverage, data-flow coverage, or mutation coverage — and the only limitation is our imagination, as can be seen from Cem Kaner’s list of 101 coverage metrics, compiled in 1996.

The latter technique, mutation coverage, may help to fight gaming of coverage numbers. The idea is to generate mutations to the code under test, such as the negation of Boolean conditions or integer outcomes, or modifications of arithmetic expressions. A good test suite should trigger a failure for any such ‘erroneous’ motivation. If you want to experiment with mutation testing in Java (or Scala), you might want to take a look at the pitest tool.

Coverage Galore

A final pitfall in using coverage metrics is to become over-enthusiastic, measuring coverage in many (possibly overlapping) ways.

Even a (relatively straightforward) coverage tool like EclEmma for Java can measure instruction, branch, line, method, and type coverage, and as a bonus can compute the cyclomatic complexity. Per metric it can show covered, missed, and total, as well as the percentage of covered items. Which of those should be used? Is it a good idea to monitor all forms of coverage at all levels?

Again, what you measure should depend on your goal.

If your project is just starting to test systematically, a useful goal will be to identify classes where a lot can be gained by adding tests. Then it makes sense to start measuring at the coarse class or method level, in order to identify classes most in need of testing. If, on the other hand, most code is reasonably well tested, looking at missed branches may provide the most insight

The general rule is to start as simple as possible (just line coverage will do), and then to add alternative metrics when the simpler metric does not lead to new insights any more.

Additional forms of coverage should be different from (orthogonal to) the existing form of coverage used. For example, line coverage and branch coverage are relatively similar. Thus, measuring branch coverage besides line coverage may not lead to many additional cases to test (depending on your code). Mutation coverage, dataflow-based coverage, or state-machine based coverage, on the other hand, are much more different from line coverage. Thus, using one of those may be more effective in increasing the diversity of your test cases.

Putting Coverage to Good Use

Managers that are aware of the above pitfalls, can certainly put coverage to good use. Here are a few ways, taken from Glover’s classic Don’t be fooled by the coverage report:

Sun and Snow

src: flickr

  1. “Code without corresponding tests can be more challenging to understand, and is harder to modify safely. Therefore, knowing whether code has been tested, and seeing the actual test coverage numbers, can allow developers and managers to more accurately predict the time needed to modify existing code.” — I can only agree.

  2. “Monitoring coverage reports helps development teams quickly spot code that is growing without corresponding tests” — This happens: see our paper on the co-evolution of test and production code)

  3. “Given that a code coverage report is most effective at demonstrating sections of code without adequate testing, quality assurance personnel can use this data to assess areas of concern with respect to functional testing.” — A good reason to combine user story acceptance testing with coverage analysis.

Summary

Test coverage analysis is an important tool that any development team taking testing seriously should use.

More than anything else, coverage analysis is a reviewing tool that you can use to improve your own (test) code, and to to evaluate someone else’s code and test cases.

Coverage numbers can not be used as a key performance indicator (KPI) for project success. If your manager uses coverage as a KPI, make sure he is aware of the pitfalls.

Coverage analysis is useful to managers: If you are a team lead, make sure you understand test coverage. Then use coverage analysis as a way to engage in discussion with your developers about their (test) code and the team’s test strategy.

Further reading

  1. Eric Bouwers, Joost Visser, and Arie van Deursen. Getting what you Measure: Four common pitfalls in using software metrics for project management. Communications of the ACM, 55(7): 54-59, 2012.
  2. Andrew Glover. In pursuit of code quality: Don’t be fooled by the coverage report. IBM Developer Works blog post, January, 2006.
  3. Martin Fowler. Test Coverage. http://martinfowler.com/bliki/TestCoverage.html, 17 April 2012.
  4. Alberto Savoia. How Much Unit Test Coverage Do You Need? – The Testivus Answer. Artima Forum, 2007. (Also listed as answer to the Stackoverlfow question “What is reasonable code coverage and why?“).
  5. Brian Marick. How to misuse code coverage, 1999
  6. Cem Kaner. Software Negligence and Testing Coverage (Appendix A lists 101 coverage criteria). Proceedings of STAR 96
    (Fifth International Conference on Software Testing, Analysis, and Review), 1996.
  7. Zhu, Hall, May. Software Unit Test Coverage and Adequacy. ACM Computing Surveys, 1997.
  8. Andy Zaidman, Bart Van Rompaey, Arie van Deursen, and Serge Demeyer. Studying the co-evolution of production and test code in open source and industrial developer test processes through repository mining (open access). Empirical Software Engineering 16:325–364, 2011.
  9. Dimitrios Athanasiou. Constructing a Test Code Quality Model and Empirically Assessing its Relation to Issue Handling Performance (pdf). Master’s Thesis, Delft University of Technology, 2011.

© Arie van Deursen, 2013.
Image credits: Flickr.
Source featured image: flickr

Line Coverage: Lessons from JUnit

In unit testing, achieving 100% statement coverage is not realistic. But what percentage would good testers get? Which cases are typically not included? Is it important to actually measure coverage?

To answer questions like these, I took a look at the test suite of JUnit itself. This is an interesting case, since it is created by some of the best developers around the world, who care a about testing. If they decide not to test a given case, what can we learn from that?

Coverage of JUnit as measured by Cobertura

Coverage of JUnit as measured by Cobertura

Overall Coverage at First Sight

Applying Cobertura to the 600+ test cases of JUnit leads to the results shown above (I used the maven-enabled version of JUnit 4.11). Overall, instruction coverage is almost 85%. In total, JUnit comprises around 13,000 lines of code and 15,000 lines of test code (both counted with wc). Thus, the test suite that is larger than the framework, leaves around 15% of the code untouched.

Covering Deprecated Code?

A first finding is that in JUnit coverage of deprecated code tends be to be lower. Junit 4.11 contains 13 deprecated classes (more than 10% of the code base), which achieve only 65% line coverage.

JUnit includes another dozen or so deprecated methods spread over different classes. These tend to be small methods (just forwarding a call), which often are not tested.

Furthermore, JUnit 4.11 includes both the modern org.junit.* packages as well as the older junit.* packages from 3.8.x. These older packages constitute ~20% of the code base. Their coverage is 70%, whereas the newer packages have a coverage of almost 90%.

This lower coverage for deprecated code is somewhat surprising, since in a test-driven development process you would expect good coverage of code before it gets deprecated. The underlying mechanism may be that after deprecation there is no incentive to maintain the test cases: If I would issue a ticket to improve the test cases for a deprecated method on JUnit I suspect this issue would not get a high priority. (This calls for some repository mining research on deprecation and testing, in the spirit of our work on co-evolution of tests and code).

Another implication is that when configuring coverage tools, it may be worth excluding deprecated code from analysis. A coverage tool that can recognize @Deprecated tags would be ideal, but I am not aware of such a tool. If excluding deprecated code is impossible, an option is to adjust coverage warning thresholds in your continuous integration tools: For projects rich in deprecated code it will be harder to maintain high coverage percentages.

Ignoring deprecated code, the JUnit coverage is 93%.

An Untested Class!

In the non-deprecated code, there was one class not covered by any test:
runners.model.NoGenericTypeParametersValidator. This class validates that @Theories are not applied to generic types (which are problematic due to type erasure).

I easily found the pull request introducing the validator about a year ago. Interestingly, the pull request included a test class clearly aimed at testing the new validator. What happened?

  • Tests in JUnit are executed via @Suites. The new test class, however, was not added to any suite, and hence not executed.
  • Once added to the proper suite, it turned out the new tests failed: the new validation code was never actually invoked.

I posted a comment on the (already closed) pull request. The original developer responded quickly, and provided a fix for the code and the tests within a day.

Note that finding this issue through coverage thresholds in a continuous integration server may not be so easy. The pull request in question causes a 1% increase in code size, and a 1% decrease in coverage. Alerts based on thresholds need to be sensitive to small changes like these. (And, the current ant-based Cloudbees JUnit continuous integration server does not monitor coverage at all).

What I’d really want is continuous integration alerts based on coverage deltas for the files modified in the pull request only. I am, however, not aware of tools supporting this at the moment.

The Usual Suspects: 6%.

To understand the final 5-6% of uncovered code, I had a look at the remaining classes. For those, there was not a single method with more than 2 or 3 uncovered lines. For this uncovered code, various typical categories can be distinguished.

First, there is the category too simple to test. Here is an example from org.junit.Assume, in which an assumeTrue is turned into an assumeFalse by just adding a negation operator:

public static void assumeFalse(boolean b) {
  assumeTrue(!b);
}

Other instances of too simple to test include basic getters, or overrides for methods such as toString.

A special case of too simple to test is the empty method. These are typically used to provide (or override) default behavior in inheritance hierarchies:

/**
 * Override to set up your specific external resource.
 *
 * @throws if setup fails (which will disable {@code after}
 */
protected void before() throws Throwable {
    // do nothing
}

Another category is code that is dead by design. An example is a static only class, which need not be instantiated. It is good Java practice (adopted selectively in JUnit too) to make this explicit by declaring the constructor private:

/**
 * Protect constructor since it is a static only class
 */
protected Assert() {
}

In other cases dead by design involves an assertion that certain situations will never occur. An example is Request.java:

catch (InitializationError e) {
  throw new RuntimeException(
    "Bug in saff's brain: " +
    "Suite constructor, called as above, should always complete");
}

This is similar to a default case in a switch statement that can never be reached.

A final category consists of bad weather behavior that is unlikely to happen. This typically manifests itself in not explicitly testing that certain exceptions are caught:

try {
  ...
} catch (InitializationError e) {
  return new ErrorReportingRunner(null, e);
}

Here the catch clause is not covered by any test. Similar cases occur for example when raising an illegal argument exception if inputs do not meet simple validation criteria.

EclEmma and JaCoCo

While all of the above is based on Cobertura, I started out using EclEmma/Jacoco 0.6.0 in Eclipse for doing the coverage analysis. There were two (small) surprises.

First, merely enabling EclEmma code coverage caused the JUnit test suite to fail. The issue at hand is that in JUnit test methods can be sorted according to different criteria. This involves reflection, and the test outcomes were influenced by additional (synthetic) methods generated by Jacoco. The solution is to configure Jacoco so that instrumentation of certain classes is disabled — or to make the JUnit test suite more robust against instrumentation.

Second, JaCoCo does not report coverage of code raising exceptions. In contrast to Cobertura, JaCoCo does on-the-fly instrumentation using an agent attached to the Java class loader. Instructions in blocks that are not completed due to an exception are not reported as being covered.

As a consequence, JaCoCo is not suitable for exception-intensive code. JUnit, however, is rich in exceptions, for example in the various Assert methods. Consequently, the code coverage for JUnit reported by JaCoCo is around 3% lower than by Cobertura.

Lessons Learned

Applying line coverage to one of the best tested projects in the world, here is what we learned:

  1. Carefully analyzing coverage of code affected by your pull request is more useful than monitoring overall coverage trends against thresholds.
  2. It may be OK to lower your testing standards for deprecated code, but do not let this affect the rest of the code. If you use coverage thresholds on a continuous integration server,  consider setting them differently for deprecated code.
  3. There is no reason to have methods with more than 2-3 untested lines of code.
  4. The usual suspects (simple code, dead code, bad weather behavior, …) correspond to around 5% of uncovered code.

In summary, should you monitor line coverage? Not all development teams do, and even in the JUnit project it does not seem to be a standard practice. However, if you want to be as good as the JUnit developers, there is no reason why your line coverage would be below 95%. And monitoring coverage is a simple first step to verify just that.